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THE DEFENDANT AS A WITNESS
KENNETH W. ROBINSON
of the Denver Bar

In the ordinary case, the defendant will take the stand as a
matter of course. After all he stands charged with crime. He
has plead not guilty. 'The State has presented its evidence. The
motion for directed verdict has been overruled. And the jury
properly wants to hear his story.
If the defendant does not testify, there must be the most compelling of reasons. Obviously, no lawyer will assume that the presumption of innocence and the instruction upon failure to testify
will satisfy the natural feeling of the jury and of us all that an innocent man will be anxious to present his defense in person on the
stand. And unfavorable inferences likely will be drawn when he
elects not to do so.
Occasionally, however, serious questions arise in our minds
whether more harm than good will be done by offering our client
as a witness. Unfortunately, there are no books to guide us; there
are no precedents to be examined. We must trust alone to whatever inate ability we have to gauge the situation at hand and to
appraise the overall picture and pray for a large measure of good
luck.
This question generally grows out of one or more of the following situatinns which may cnnfrnnt us at the end of the State's
case.
First: Will the defendant's testimony supply some proof missing from the State's case, and which we believe to be vital before
conviction can be had?
Second: Will our client's cross-examination probably reveal
guilt of other offenses? These may be offenses of which he presently stands charged or which will result in the bringing of additional charges.
Third: Is the personality of our client such that he will make
a very unimpressive witness who may convict himself?
Fourth: Has he a criminal record?
As to the first, unless we are satisfied in our own minds that
the State has actually failed to prove its case and that an appellate court will so hold, it is submitted the defendant better take
the stand. For experience cautions us not to rely too heavily in
the reviewing court upon technicalities. As one former Judge
used to say: What he was interested in was doing substantial
justice. And if the appellate court feels substantial justice has
been done, it will not look for technical reasons to reverse.
As to the second, certainly we do not want to find ourselves
in a position where a careful and thorough cross-examination of
our client will prove that he is guilty of other offenses as well as
the one presently on trial. Perhaps here it would be better to
rely upon the weakness of the State's case, presumption of in-
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nocence and the court's instruction that the failure to testify is
no evidence of guilt.
As to the third, the fact that our client does not appear to
us as a man of impressive personality, or that he will make a
"good" witness should not keep us from remembering at all times
that this is his day in court and it is he who may have to serve
many years upon conviction. It seems reasonable to believe that
if he is convicted there will be many nights and days in the penitentiary when he will wonder why he did not testify. It is well
to remember that an acquitted man generally believes it was because of his own sagacity; a convicted one knows it was the fault
of his lawyer.
Perhaps it is the fourth of the situations outlined, our client's
former criminal record, that causes us the most trouble in determining whether he should testify. We realize, of course, that unless he takes the stand, the jury will not be advised of his former
record. If he does testify, that fact will be known. What shall
we do about it? There is no answer which will apply to all cases.
There is no formula by which we can resolve the question. We
must sense the state of the case and the feeling in the court room,
which is probably reflected in the jury box, to determine whether
it is necessary to risk the development of this information.
One or two considerations may help us in trying to decide.
What was the nature of the former conviction? How long ago
was it? Does our client's record contain other convictions as well,
or is it only orie? If his record, shall we say, is that of involuntary
manslaughter some years ago and he is now on trial for some business offense, embezzlement, falsification of records, et cetera, and
the State's case against him is strong, it would seem probably the
part of wisdom to put him on the witness stand. If, however, our
client once before has served a term for embezzlement, and is
again on trial for embezzlement, and We have other evidence apart
from his testimony which can be produced to counteract the State's
case at least in part, perhaps it is well not to put the defendant
on the stand, but to rely on the inherent weakness of the State's
case plus such evidence apart from the defendant's testimony as
we can muster.
If he does testify, you will, of course, want to bring out his
former convictions yourself. You will not want to wait for crossexamination to develop this. I am sure we are all in agreement
from the standpoint of trial tactics that if there is something
damaging, and you know it will be brought out from the witness,
it is best to bring it out yourself in the course of your. own examination.
There is no easy solution. It has always seemed, however,
in the last analysis the defendant should take the witness stand
and should testify unless, as noted, there are overwhelming reasons why he should not. If, after careful consideration, you still
are in doubt, it is recommended that the defendant take the stand.
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And if he does not take the stand, by all means have him
give you a note in his own handwriting, stating it is his view,
as well as yours, that he should not testify and requesting you
not to call him as a witness. If he has a wife, she should approve
in writing this note. The advisability of such precaution was
impressed upon me as a prosecutor in the '20's. In a serious case,
involving the failure of a bank in Denver,* the defendant on trial
did not take the stand. After his conviction, he charged his lawyers with many derelictions, among them, their refusal to let him
testify. They were able and experienced trial lawyers. These
lawyers presented to the District Court a letter signed by the
defendant stating that his position was that he should not take
the witness stand. Without that letter it might have been very
embarrassing.
Frankly, I am afraid this last suggestion, always to take a
letter from the defendant if he does not testify, is about all that
may have been contributed by this discussion.
Whatever your decision, you never can be satisfied you were
right or just lucky.
!

CASE: COMME:NTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE SANCTITY OF A LEGISLATIVE ACT IS SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE LEGISLATURE ITSELF-WHAT AMOUNTS TO AN EFFECTIVE REPEAL ?-Plaintiffs brought action to recover a judgment for
treble damages allegedly due them by reason of the defendant's
having collected interest on a loan in excess of that allowed under
chapter 108 Session Laws of Colorado, 1913. The defendant demonstrated that chapter 157, Session Laws of Colorado, 1935, stated
that the 1913 Act was repealed; that the compilers of the 1,935
Colorado Statutes Annotated thereafter omitted the 1913 Act
from their compilation; that the State Banking Commissioner
discontinued enforcing the provisions of the 1913 Act in reliance
of the 1935 Act; and that loan companies generally considered
the 1913 Act repealed. On defendant's motion the case was dismissed with prejudice, and the plaintiffs appealed. On May 12,
1952, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the decision of the
trial court, declaring that the 1913 Act had not been effectively
repealed by the 1935 Act insofar as loans over $300 were concerned since the 1935 Act by its title was confined to loans of $300
or less. This despite the fact that the body of the 1935 Act "repealed" the former Act. (Sullivan v. Siegal. ..... Colo ........ ...... P.
....... ) (1952.)
Speaking through Mr. Justice Alter, the court held that the
* Mandell v. People, 76 Colo. 296.

